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― I ― 
Can administrative law foster good governance? Some argue that it not only can but must do 
so; that fostering good governance is its raison d’être. Professor Juli Ponce has argued that 
“[a]dministrative Law… is concerned with good decisions, with good administration. It is 
important that Public Administration makes both the legal and the right decisions because 
people demand good decisions, together with proper reasons to back them, and they want to 
be heard and to have a say in the matter.”1 Others too believe that to “stimulate better 
decision making” by public bodies “is a core goal of administrative law”,2 and that it is 
central to “good government”.3  
I do not intend to dispute these statements; I do not disagree with them, so far as they go. 
However, I will seek to add a warning to these claims about administrative law and good 
governance. Although good governance is important, and although administrative law—
understood here, as it usually is in Canada, as the law of judicial review of administrative 
action—can and does contribute to it in ways that I will describe, one must be careful about 
how one goes about pursuing this goal, lest the pursuit become self-defeating.   
Needless to say, good governance is a complex concept. We can, and do, disagree about what 
it involves or requires. Is good governance about the efficiency of administrative processes? 
Their fairness? Is it about policy outcomes meeting some substantive criterion (whether 
increased economic welfare, equality, or respect for fundamental individual rights)? 
Administrative law must settle these disagreements to some extent, but—as in other areas of 
the law—the settlements can only be provisional and contested, and can differ from one 
jurisdiction to another. While some of the differences caused by time and place might be too 
bound up with contingent historical, political, or other circumstances to be more than objects 
of curiosity, others present lessons that we can learn by comparing the administrative law of 
different jurisdictions. 
In this essay, I present four aspects of good governance, introducing them in what I 
tentatively think is an order of increasing difficulty for administrative law and its integration 
with the broader legal landscape—at least, within the Canadian legal system. They are, first, 
efficient decision-making; second, the quality of the decision-making process; third, the 
substantive quality of administrative decisions; and fourth, their legality and constitutionality. 
For each of these facets of good governance, after a brief explanation of its nature, I briefly 
                                               
1 Juli Ponce, “The Right to Good Administration and the role of Administrative Law in promoting good 
government”, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737538> at 2. 
2 John McMillan, “Can Administrative Law Foster Good Governance?” Whitmore Lecture 2009, Sydney, 
September 16, 2009. 
3 Hon David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: Some Doctrine and Cases”, October 21, 2017, 
online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924049> at 4. (Note that Justice Stratas 
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present the ways in which administrative law can support it, and also the limits of its ability 
to do so. I focus on Canadian law, but sometimes contrast it with that of New Zealand or the 
United Kingdom (to whose legal system that of New Zealand is still strongly, although no 
longer fully, attuned). The Canadian experience, I will argue, should be taken as a warning 
about the dangers of a simplistic commitment to one aspect of good governance—namely, the 
substantive quality of administrative decisions—at the expense of others. 
― II ― 
That governance needs to be efficient (in the colloquial sense of the word, not necessarily the 
economic one) is, I expect, uncontroversial. Dilatory or disorganized administration is 
incompatible with good governance. When administrative procedures are not carried out in a 
timely fashion, laws are not enforced, policies are not implemented—and lives are sometimes 
wrecked in the process.4 Unsurprisingly, administrative law has some means at its disposal to 
incentivize, or even to force, the administration to act with due dispatch. Indeed, these 
mechanisms are among its oldest tools. 
One such ancient mechanism is the old prerogative writ of mandamus, and the remedies “in 
the nature of mandamus” that have succeeded it with the abolition of the prerogative writs 
and their replacement with applications for judicial review. This remedy is an order, issued 
by a court to an official in the executive branch or administrative decision-maker, to perform 
a statutory duty. In Canadian law, the criteria that must be met before such an order will be 
issued are that the decision-maker owes the applicant a clear duty to act; that the applicant 
has satisfied any conditions precedent to the performance of that duty and, moreover, 
demanded that the duty be performed, allowed a reasonable time for its performance, and 
received an express or implicit refusal (which can be inferred from the decision-maker’s 
silence or delay); that the remedy in the nature of mandamus, and no other, will be effective; 
and that the court is satisfied that relief in the nature of mandamus should be granted (taking 
into account the “balance of convenience” and other considerations that can sometimes impel 
a court to deny administrative law remedies, which are generally discretionary).5 These are 
demanding criteria, reflecting the courts’ reluctance to order the executive to act in a 
particular way. However, in those cases when they are met, mandamus allows the courts to 
put an end to administrative neglect or obstruction, even in the absence of specific legally-
prescribed time limits for the performance of administrative duties.6 
                                               
4 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307, at para 154 (Lebel J, dissenting, 
but not on this point) (“[a]busive administrative delay is wrong and it does not matter if it wrecks only your life 
and not your hearing”).  
5 Apotex Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 FC 742, 51 CPR (3d) 339 (aff’d by Apotex Inc v Canada 
(Attorney General), [1994] 3 SCR 1100). 
6 See e.g. Conille v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 FCR 33; Shahid v Canada 
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The other mechanism that can contribute to, or at least incentivize, efficient decision-making 
and the timely carrying out of administrative duties is the doctrine of abuse of process. As the 
Supreme Court of Canada has explained, “[i]n order to find an abuse of process, the court 
must be satisfied that, ‘the damage to the public interest in the fairness of the administrative 
process should the proceeding go ahead would exceed the harm to the public interest in the 
enforcement of the legislation if the proceedings were halted’”.7 Such a finding may result 
from administrative delay, especially if the delay has the effect of compromising the fairness 
of a hearing or a party’s  ability to make his or her case to the administrative decision-maker. 
However, exceptionally,  
unacceptable delay may amount to an abuse of process in certain 
circumstances even where the fairness of the hearing has not been 
compromised. Where inordinate delay has directly caused significant 
psychological harm to a person, or attached a stigma to a person’s 
reputation, such that the [administrative] system would be brought into 
disrepute, such prejudice may be sufficient to constitute an abuse of 
process.8     
If the court finds that the administrative proceeding has become an abuse of process, that the 
abuse will perpetuated if the proceeding is allowed to continue, and if there is no adequate 
alternative remedy, it can order the proceeding to be stayed.9 Here again, the threshold an 
applicant must cross before being granted the remedy is high. Courts are understandably 
reticent to conclude that the law should not be enforced, even if its enforcement has become 
problematic in some sense, or even has caused some prejudice to individuals subject to it. Yet 
sometimes unjustified, “inordinate and indeed unconscionable” delay resulting from 
“bureaucratic indolence and failure to give the matter the attention it deserved given the 
rights and interests at stake”10 may prompt a court to put an end to the proceedings that it has 
affected.  
Of course, a stay entered in a given case does not make for efficient administration, or even 
rescue a faulty administrative process on a better-late-than-never basis, in the way relief in 
the nature of mandamus might. It must be hoped that administrators will take an interest in 
judicial decisions putting an end to their proceedings and mend their ways to avoid similar 
interventions in the future. To what extent this actually happens is difficult to say. However, 
the fact that similar problems arise time and again in connection with the operation of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
the length of an investigation … can serve as a convenient excuse for indefinite delay, which the Court will not 
accept”). 
7 Blencoe, supra note 4, at para 120, quoting Donald JM Brown and John M Evans, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Canvasback, 1998 (loose-leaf)), at 9-68. 
8 Ibid, at para 115. 
9 See Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Tobiass, [1997] 3 SCR 391 at paras 89-91. 
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same administrative bodies suggests that judicial decisions reproving their conduct are not as 
effective at fostering good governance as one might wish.  
― III ― 
Beyond mere efficiency, administrative law can help ensure that administrative decisions are 
made in ways that are, in principle, likely to ensure their quality. Even when it is not directly 
concerned with the substantive rightness of these decisions (whether understood in terms of 
correctness or some form of reasonableness)—something to which I will turn in the next 
section—administrative law is interested in aspects of administrative decision-making 
processes that can be presumed to affect the rightness of its results. If the decision-maker 
makes sure to properly gather and analyse relevant evidence and submissions while avoiding 
irrelevant ones, he or she will, one may reasonably hope, come to better informed answers.  
Note that I speak of “processes” rather than “procedures”. That is because a defect in the 
decision-making process that can cause a court to interfere with a decision resulting from that 
process may be classified not only as an instance of “procedural unfairness”, but also as one 
of substantive “unreasonableness” (in Canada), or “illegality” (in the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand). Indeed, as Justice Stratas observes, “[d]istinctions between procedure and 
substance are sometimes difficult to make”,11 and this may especially be so with respect 
precisely to the rules I am considering in this section. Below, I consider both procedural and 
substantive rules that bear on the administrative decision-making process.  
As a general matter, “[t]he fact that a decision is administrative”—as rather than legislative in 
nature—“and affects ‘the rights, privileges or interests of an individual’ is sufficient to trigger 
the application of [a] duty of fairness”12 incumbent on the decision-maker. The content of 
that duty in any given case will depend on a number of factors, which include (but are not 
limited to) the nature of the decision-maker, the relevant law—including constitutional and 
“quasi-constitutional” law13—and practice, as well as the importance of the decision to the 
                                               
11 Stratas, supra note 3, at 96. 
12 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817 at para 20. 
13 The most important constitutional provision here is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, beieng Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, [the Charter] s 7 
(providing that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”). Note that the procedural 
safeguards of s 11, which include notably the right to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair hearing, 
and the protection against self-incrimination, are only available to persons “charged with an offence”, and the 
courts have interpreted this phrase as excluding persons subject to administrative proceedings unless they face 
“true penal consequences”―of which even a substantial fine is not one: see, most recently Guindon v Canada, 
2015 SCC 41, [2015] 3 SCR 3; Goodwin v British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46, 
[2015] 3 SCR 250; see also Steven Penney, “‘Chartering’ in the Shadow of Lochner: Guindon, Goodwin and the 
Criminal-Administrative Distinction at the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2016) 76 SCLR (2d) 307. The best-
known quasi-constitutional instrument relevant here is the Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44, para 2(e) 
(protecting a person’s “right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the 
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person affected by it, and any legitimate expectations that person might have that a particular 
procedure would be followed.14 
Specific duties of administrative decision-makers falling under the general heading of 
procedural fairness can notably include a duty to receive submissions and evidence, 
sometimes in writing but, in those cases where credibility is a significant issue, by hearing 
witnesses in person;15 a duty to appraise persons affected by a decision of evidence 
prejudicial to them, the decision-maker’s concerns, or generally the “case to meet”;16 and a 
duty to decide impartially, without bias, or indeed even an appearance of bias, provided that 
“reasonably well-informed persons could properly have” a “reasonable apprehension” of such 
appearance.17   
As already mentioned, these procedural rules are supplemented by those applied under the 
headings of “substantive” or “illegality” review, which ought to remind administrative 
decision-makers that, in the words of Justice Rand in a foundational Supreme Court decision, 
Roncarelli v Duplessis, “there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to 
operate”.18 As Justice Rand pointed out,  
[i]n public regulation … there is no such thing as absolute and 
untrammelled “discretion”, that is that action can be taken on any ground or 
for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator; no 
legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an 
unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capricious 
or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute.19  
A decision based on irrelevant considerations, or one that fails to take into account prescribed 
considerations, or made in pursuance of an improper purpose,20 or one that frustrates the 
                                                                                                                                                  
legislative powers of Parliament, but, in some provinces, similar legislation applies in the provincial sphere; on 
the notion of quasi-constitutional legislation in Canada see especially Vanessa MacDonnell, “A Theory of 
Quasi-Constitutional Legislation” (2016) 53(2) OHLJ 507; Léonid Sirota, “Erasing Constitutional White Spots”, 
Double Aspect (blog), December 13, 2016, online: <https://doubleaspect.blog/2016/12/13/erasing-
constitutional-white-spots/>; and Maxime St-Hilaire, “‘Quasi Constitutional’ Status as *Not* Implying a Form 
Requirement”, I-CONnect (Blog), August 8,  2017, online: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/08/quasi-
constitutional-status-as-not-implying-a-form-requirement/>. 
14 Baker, supra note 12, at paras 22-28. 
15 Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177. 
16 May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 SCR 809.  
17 Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board, [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 391. 
18 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121 at 140. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Stratas, supra note 3, at 60 (arguing, with reference i.a. to Roncarelli, “that the pursuit of unauthorized 
purposes renders a decision unacceptable or indefensible”, and therefore unreasonable, as that term was defined 
in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 at para 47); Roncarelli itself, however, did not 
use the language of reasonableness, and indeed was not strictly speaking an administrative law case at all, 
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purpose of the applicable legislation,21 will accordingly be invalid, on the grounds of 
unreasonableness in Canada, and of illegality in the UK or New Zealand. However, 
administrative decision-makers must exercise what discretionary powers they are given—not 
“fetter” or abdicate their discretion by binding themselves to pre-ordained policies.22 
Finally, as suggested above, a number of administrative law rules and principles sit at the 
boundary between procedure and substance or illegality. This is perhaps most notably the 
case of the duty to provide reasons for decision. In Canadian law, the duty to provide some 
reasons is considered to be a matter of procedural fairness, while the adequacy of the reasons 
given is regarded as a substantive matter, bearing on whether the decision under review was 
reasonable.23  
Whether ostensibly procedural, substantive, or both, these rules or principles are meant to 
ensure that administrative decisions are the result of an impartial pursuit of the purposes and 
objectives set out by the relevant legislation, and are based on a fair consideration of the 
relevant evidence and submissions on those issues that the legislation prescribes, while 
avoiding those that the legislation excludes. Quite apart from any assessment of the true 
substance of an administrative decision, courts are thus able to steer administrative decision-
makers into exercising their powers in a manner that comports with the standards of good 
governance.   
― IV ― 
Decision-making processes are, in themselves, of limited value; what matters, from the 
perspective of good governance, is that administrative decisions be substantively sound, and 
not merely be reached in the right way.24 An administrative system that somehow managed to 
follow proper processes and yet to reach consistently perverse conclusions—unlikely though 
the idea seems—would not be anyone’s idea of good administration. And, unsurprisingly, 
administrative law takes an interest in the substance of the administration’s decisions, as well 
as in their timeliness and the processes used to make them. However, courts looking to ensure 
that administrative decisions that they review are sound proceed cautiously. Judicial review 
of the merits of administrative decisions, as opposed to that of the process followed in 
                                               
21 See e.g. Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Canada (Public Works and Government Services), 2012 SCC 29, 
[2012] 2 SCR 108. 
22 Maple Lodge Farms v Government of Canada, [1982] 2 SCR 2 at 6-7; Stemijon Investments Ltd v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2011 FCA 299 at para 24 (“[a] decision that is the product of a fettered discretion must per 
se be unreasonable”). 
23 See Fashoranti v College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, 2015 NSCA 25, 356 NSR (2d) 350 at 
para 30. 
24 But see Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure”, in James E Fleming (ed) 
Nomos L: Getting to the Rule of Law (NYU Press, New York, 2011) 3 (highlighting the importance of 
procedural rights in the determination of a person’s rights and obligations, and their relationship to human 
dignity; these concerns are of course very important, but external to the good governance perspective I am 
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reaching them (considered in the previous section)25 or their consistency with the norms of 
ordinary or constitutional law (considered next), is invariably deferential, both in Canada and 
in New Zealand—at least to some degree.  
The notion of a “standard of review” is very important here. In Justice Stratas’ words, to 
“[d]etermine the proper standard of review” means to ask “[j]ust how ‘fussy’ should the court 
be”.26 At the very least, a court might be deferential to an administrative decision-maker, or 
not. Perhaps there are various degrees of deference; perhaps there is a spectrum of deference 
without precise gradations. For better or for worse, issues related to the standard of review 
probably consume most of the intellectual oxygen in Canadian administrative law (and a 
smaller but still appreciable fraction in New Zealand).  
The general approach to issues of deference—whether there are a limited number of fixed 
standards of review or a more fluid “variable intensity of review” is debated. If fixed 
standards are favoured—as they ostensibly are by the Supreme Courts in both Canada and 
New Zealand—, the number of deferential standards and their meaning must be settled. If a 
“variable intensity” approach is preferred, it is necessary to determine the factors that are 
going to suggest greater or lesser deference. And of course, even if these questions are given 
agreed upon answers, the precise amount of deference owed to a given administrative 
decision-maker can still be a matter of dispute. It would not be possible for me to even begin 
describing these controversies in any detail. I will only briefly sketch out the current state of 
the law in Canada, and then consider the reasons for judicial deference to administrative 
decision-makers in the course of merits review, which will lead me into the final part of this 
overview.   
The standard of review for the merits of administrative decisions in Canada is currently 
described as “reasonableness”.27 It is, the Supreme Court’s leading precedent says, 
a deferential standard animated by the principle that … certain questions 
that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one 
specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of 
possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation 
within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. … In judicial review, 
                                               
25 As noted in the previous section, in Canada, the review of process-related issues classified as substantive now 
adopts the language of “reasonableness”, which appears deferential, yet process failures can cause a decision to 
be treated as unreasonable per se, making deference something of a pretense. In New Zealand, by contrast, these 
issues are treated under the heading of “illegality”, and review is not deferential. As for review of those issues 
that are classified as procedural, Justice Stratas observes that the Supreme Court of Canada “is all over the map” 
when it comes to deciding whether any deference is owed to administrative decision-makers: Stratas, supra note 
3, at 91. 
26 Stratas, ibid, at 33. 
27 Previously, two deferential standards of review existed: “patent unreasonableness” and “reasonableness 
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reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, 
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is 
also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, 
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.28 
The Court added that “[d]eference in the context of the reasonableness standard therefore 
implies that courts will give due consideration to the determinations of decision makers.”29 
The “determinations” to which courts are required to “give due consideration” and defer are 
the results of the administrative process, not the reasoning that the decision-maker followed. 
Indeed, courts are required to defer “even if the reasons in fact given do not seem wholly 
adequate to support the decision”,30 or indeed if no reasons were given at all.31 Deference, in 
such cases is due to “the reasons which could be offered in support of” the impugned 
decision.32 Elsewhere, I described the process of deferring to reasons that could be, but were 
not, in fact, offered, and which have to be made up by the reviewing court, as the judge 
“playing chess with herself, and contriving to have one side deliberately lose to the other”.33 
Courts defer to administrative decision-makers for a number of overlapping reasons. One 
might be that, as Richard Posner has suggested, deference to administrative decision-makers 
is a time- and effort-economizing device that helps judges avoid the burdensome 
responsibility of having to “understand the activity from which a case before them has 
arisen”.34 To the extent that this accusation is well-founded, it does not speak well of the 
courts’ commitment to good governance—or to anything else other the judges’ leisure. 
Respect for Parliamentary supremacy, which, subject in Canada to significant constitutional 
constraints, ought to mean that if legislation provides for decisions of a particular sort to be 
made by the administration instead of the courts, the legislation must be applied, is another 
reason for judicial deference to administrative decisions.35 While respect for the wishes of the 
                                               
28 Dunsmuir, ibid, at para 47. 
29 Ibid, at para 49. 
30 David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed, The 
Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 279 at 304, cited with approval in Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708. 
31 Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 SCR 293 
[Edmonton East]. 
32 Ibid, at para 40 (emphasis in the original). 
33 Leonid Sirota, “Law in La-La-Land”, Double Aspect (blog), December 4, 2016, online: 
<https://doubleaspect.blog/2016/12/04/law-in-la-la-land> [Sirota, “La-La-Land”]; see also Paul Daly, “Which 
Way Forward for Canadian Administrative Law? Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping 
Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47”, Administrative Law Matters (blog), November 14, 2016, online: 
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2016/11/14/which-way-forward-edmonton-city-v-edmonton-
east-capilano-shopping-centres-ltd-2016-scc-47/> (describing the Supreme Court’s majority’s reasoning as 
“frankly … quite bizarre”) [Daly, “Way Forward”]. 
34 Richard Posner, Reflection on Judging (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013) at 85-86. 
35 See Canadian Union of Public Employees Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 
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legislative branch might not appear to be directly related to good governance either, insofar 
as the legislature was motivated by the belief that making an administrative body responsible 
for the enforcement of legislation, deference to its wishes furthers these beliefs.  
Finally, the courts themselves may believe that administrative decision-makers will be more 
likely than the courts to reach the best decisions in those cases which legislation assigns to 
their determination. (This argument typically goes together with that based on the legislative 
decision to confer the matter to an administrative decision-maker,36 but it is analytically a 
distinct one, and courts tend to express themselves as sharing and endorsing the legislation’s 
policy.) Administrative decision-makers may reach better decisions than courts because the 
matters within their purview require peculiar expertise, or involve policy judgments that 
administrators are more apt to make than courts, or both. In the foundational case that set 
Canadian courts on the deferential course which they are still navigating, albeit changing tack 
from time to time, a unanimous Supreme Court insisted that the legislation at issue, which 
governed labour relations in the public sector, “call[ed] for a delicate balance between the 
need to maintain public services, and the need to maintain collective bargaining. 
Considerable sensitivity and unique expertise … is all the more required if the twin purposes 
of the legislation are to be met.”37 This, needless to say, is a concern with good governance, 
and it plays a very important role in shaping administrative law—albeit pushing it in a non-
interventionist direction. 
But is the courts’ belief in the administrative decision-makers’ superior expertise or policy-
making skill justified? Judge Posner, as he then was, pointedly observed that many of the 
administrative decision-makers to whom courts may defer due to their presumed expertise 
“are poorly trained, horribly overworked, highly politicized, or all these things at once”.38 
Deference is due to all sorts of administrative decision-makers, from the specialized labour 
arbitrators of the sort involved in NB Liquor to government ministers. Judge Posner’s 
skepticism is doubtless more apposite in some cases than in others. A forceful dissent in the 
recent Edmonton East case observed that while it is sometimes true that administrative 
decision-makers are experts due to their qualifications or experience, even this expertise does 
not necessarily extend to all questions that these decision-makers may be called upon to 
address.39 The dissenting judges’ view was that “[c]ourts must not infer from the mere 
creation of an administrative tribunal that it necessarily possesses greater relative expertise in 
all matters it decides, especially on questions of law.”40 As the emphasized words suggest, it 
is with respect to legal issues, to which I next turn, that deference to administrative decision-
makers is most likely to be problematic. As for more fact-bound issues, the idea that judicial 
                                               
36 See ibid. 
37 NB Liquor, ibid. 
38 Posner, supra note 34, at 86.  
39 Edmonton East, supra note 31, at para 83 (Brown and Côté JJ, dissenting). 
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deference to administrative decision-makers is more conducive to good governance seems 
more plausible, although the Edmonton East dissenters’ warning against “transforming the 
presumption of deference into an irrebuttable rule”41 is still apposite. 
― V ― 
The final component of good governance that I would like to discuss is the compliance of 
administrative decision-making with legal norms other than those of administrative law 
itself—notably with the statutory frameworks within which the decisions are made and with 
constitutional law. I will refer to this facet of good governance as legality in a narrow sense 
(to distinguish it from the broader notion of legality in UK and New Zealand law which, as 
we have seen, encompasses important aspects of the decision-making process). Now, whether 
legality in this narrow sense ought to be considered an element of good governance is 
perhaps debatable. Prof. Ponce contrasts “[t]raditional Administrative Law”, which “is not 
interested in good administrative decisions but just in the judicial review of illegal decisions”, 
with “a new viewpoint … concerned with the quality of decisions”.42 In my view, however, 
this contrast should not be exaggerated. 
Legislation and, a fortiori, constitutional law represent the considered view, at least for the 
time being, of the polity’s representatives, about what good governance means or requires. 
They may also embody commitments to fundamental values, or an allocation of and 
limitations on public powers that are arguably no less important. In Canada, this is of course 
especially true of formally constitutional or quasi-constitutional law. But, even in the 
Canadian context, “ordinary” law can have constitutional or otherwise considerable 
significance; think, for instance, of electoral legislation,43 or of that governing citizenship.44 
In New Zealand, all legislation is formally equal,45 but some statutes can be described as 
being of constitutional significance, and, as in Canada, they are not the only ones that 
embody important values. Good governance, I would argue, must at least be consistent with 
such commitments,46 as well as with the views of democratic majorities about what good 
governance actually requires.  
                                               
41 Ibid. 
42 Ponce, supra note 1, at 2. 
43 Canada Elections Act, SC 2000 c 9, and its provincial counterparts. 
44 Citizenship Act, RSC 1985 c C-29. 
45 The only, limited, exceptions to this occurs in the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s 268, which “reserves”, or 
entrenches, a number of provisions of electoral law by providing that they can only be amended by a 
Parliamentary super-majority or a referendum, and in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), s 4, which 
effectively makes that Act inferior to prior legislation, by providing that it does not impliedly repeal any prior 
inconsistent provisions, contrary to rule applicable to ordinary statutes.  
46 See Ernst v Alberta Energy Regulator, 2017 SCC 1, [2017] 1 SCR 3 at para 169 (McLachlin CJ and Moldaver 
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Now, one might think that administrative law is vigilant in its handling of this aspect of good 
governance, since it is within its “traditional” remit, and since, more broadly, the 
determination of questions of law is a long-standing core function of the courts.47 In New 
Zealand, this expectation is fulfilled. Questions of jurisdiction and of statutory interpretation 
are resolved by the courts under the heading of “illegality”—a form of review that is not 
deferential. The administrative decision-makers have to “get the law right”. In Canada, 
however, matters are rather more complicated.  
As Canadian administrative law now stands, most administrative interpretations of law are 
ostensibly entitled to judicial deference, being reviewable on the reasonableness standard. 
This is particularly the case where the administrative decision-maker “is interpreting its own 
statute or statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have particular 
familiarity”.48 This principle “applies to administrative decision makers generally”,49 at least 
when they are acting in an adjudicative capacity—regardless of whether these decision-
makers, for example, have legal expertise and (some) adjudicative independence. It applies to 
labour arbitrators,50 who are normally experts in labour law and policy; but also to boards 
charged with assessing municipal taxes,51 whose expertise lies in “complex matters of 
valuation of property” rather than in “legal interpretation going to jurisdiction”;52 to officials 
acting on behalf of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in disposing of applications 
for permanent residency based on “humanitarian and compassionate considerations;53 and to 
such political actors Ministers and the Governor-in-Council (which in practice means the 
federal cabinet).54 The principle applies, moreover, regardless of whether a court re-examines 
an administrative decision on judicial review or pursuant to a right of appeal created by 
statute,55 or of the fact that the administrative decision is jurisdictional, in the sense of 
                                               
47 Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, at 63-64, 77 ER 1342 (“any case, either criminal … or betwixt 
party and party … ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court of Justice, according to the law and 
custom of England”); Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at 754 (rejecting a suggestion that 
constitutional rights might be politically enforced as “entirely inconsistent with the judiciary’s duty to uphold 
the Constitution”); Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 546 (insisting that “only a 
court can authoritatively resolve a legal question”)New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, [1987] 1 
NZLR 641 (CA) at 658 (Cooke J) (“[i]n the end it must be the province of the Court to determine what the Act 
means and whether it has been complied with”); Attorney-General v Taylor, [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 
24 at paras 47 and 54. 
48 Dunsmuir, supra note 20, at para 54. 
49 Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 SCR 135 at para 54 
[CNR]. 
50 NB Liquor, supra note 35; Dunsmuir, supra note 20. 
51 Edmonton East, supra note 31. 
52 Ibid, at para 87 (Côté and Brown JJ, dissenting). 
53 Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61, [2015] 3 SCR 909 [Kanthasamy]; but 
see Paul Daly, “Can This Be Correct? Kanthasamy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61”, 
Administrative Law Matters (blog), December 11, 2015, online: 
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/12/11/can-this-be-correct-kanthasamy-v-canada-
citizenship-and-immigration-2015-scc-61/> (criticizing the majority opinion in Kanthasamy). 
54 CNR, supra note 49.  
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answering the question of whether the decision-maker had the power to act (in the way it did) 
at all.   
Canadian courts still require administrative decision-makers to answer some questions of law 
correctly—notably those questions “of general law ‘that [are] both of central importance to 
the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise’”.56 
Which questions will be deemed important enough to warrant correctness review—and 
whether importance alone is enough, or something more is required57—is, at present, not easy 
to predict; at any rate such questions “are rare”.58 But while one might be tempted to think 
that constitutional issues fit the criteria of centrality and foreignness to administrative 
decision-makers’ expertise, and while the Supreme Court once indicated that “constitutional 
issues, are necessarily subject to correctness review because of the unique role of [superior] 
courts as interpreters of the Constitution”,59 here again things are not so simple. Although 
correctness remains the standard of review for “decisions on constitutional entitlements and 
constitutional validity”,60 the compliance of discretionary administrative decisions with the 
Charter was at least briefly, and may still be, reviewed on the reasonableness standard.61 
Now, whether review of administrative dispositions of legal and constitutional questions is as 
deferential as the foregoing discussion suggests is actually questionable. In statutory 
interpretation cases, in Justice Stratas’ words, “disguised correctness review”, meaning that 
                                               
56 Dunsmuir, supra note 20, at para 60, quoting Toronto (City) v CUPE, Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 
77, at para 62. Occasionally, there are other circumstances that trigger correctness review: see Rogers 
Communications Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012] 2 
SCR 283 (a court and an administrative tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction over question of law arising out 
of a statutory scheme); Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3, [2015] 1 SCR 161 
(the tribunal’s decision being subject to a statutory right of appeal on a question of law); but query whether 
Tervita holding is consistent with, and can stand in light of, Edmonton East, supra note 31—in Edmonton East, 
the majority distinguished Tervita on the basis of the peculiarities of the relevant statutory language, but it is 
questionable whether the distinction is a meaningful one.   
57 See Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3 at para 51 (stating that 
correctness review was justified not only because the question was of central importance to the legal system, but 
also because there was concurrent jurisdiction between the administrative decision-maker and the courts) 
[Saguenay]; see also Paul Daly, “I Don’t Know: Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 
16”, Administrative Law Matters (blog), April 16, 2015, online: < 
http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/04/16/i-dont-know-mouvement-laique-quebecois-v-
saguenay-city-2015-scc-16/> (criticizing the court’s reasoning as “confusing”). 
58 Stratas, supra note 3, at 42. 
59 Dunsmuir, supra note 20, at para 58. 
60 Stratas, supra note 3, at 43. 
61 Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395 [Doré] set the reasonableness standard; 
Saugenay, supra note 57, applied a correctness standard on what seemed like an exceptional basis; however, two 
recent decisions, Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 
SCC 54 [Ktunaxa] and Association of Justice Counsel v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 SCC 55 applied what 
appears to be correctness review to administrative decisions regarding the scope of Charter rights, without any 
explanation; a concurring opinion in Ktunaxa applied what purported to be the Doré approach to the question of 
justification of a prima facie infringement of a Charter right. In short, it is difficult to say where the Supreme 
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“[t]he reviewing court starts with its own view of the matter, in effect creating a yardstick” by 
which it then measures the administrative decision, “seems to happen all the time when the 
SCC conducts ‘deferential’ reasonableness review”, including in some of the cases to which I 
have been referring (Kanthasamy and Edmonton East).62 Justice Stratas adds that “[d]isguised 
correctness is particularly virulent in recent SCC decisions dealing with the interpretation of 
immigration provisions”63 and, in a recent opinion for the Federal Court of Appeal, has 
observed that “it has been a while since the Supreme Court has afforded a decision-maker in 
the immigration context much of a margin of appreciation on statutory interpretation 
issues”.64 Similarly, when it comes to the application of the Doré framework for reviewing 
the consistency of administrative decisions with the Charter, it is not obvious that the level of 
scrutiny is meaningfully different from what it would have been if the courts avowedly 
engaged in correctness review.65 
Be that as it may, Canadian courts justify deference (if any) to administrative interpretations 
of law on the same grounds as they do deference on issues of fact and policy. (Indeed, as we 
have already observed, Canadian administrative law does not distinguish “reasonableness” 
and “illegality” review; the theoretical framework applicable to both is, in principle, virtually 
the same.) As noted above, respect for the legislative decision to make administrative 
decision-makers for addressing certain types of issues, and for the decision-makers’ 
expertise, are said to require the courts to defer. Yet, perhaps especially in the realm of 
questions of law, one might wonder how strongly committed the courts are to respecting 
legislative choices. Even legislative indications of an intent to have (at least some) questions 
of law that might in the first instance arise before administrative decision-makers settled by 
the courts, such as the creation of a statutory right of appeal on such questions, can be 
                                               
62 Stratas, supra note 3, at 52-53; see also, most recently Barreau du Québec v Quebec (Attorney General), 2017 
SCC 56 (holding that the standard of review is reasonableness, but showing no apparent deference to the 
administrative decision-maker, despite that fact that it had squarely addressed the statutory interpretation issue). 
63 Ibid.  
64 Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 132 at para 37; the Supreme Court’s most recent 
immigration law decision, Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, fits the 
pattern described by Justice Stratas. 
65 See Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 SCR 613 at para 37 and 38 
(Abella J) (holding that “[i] n the context of decisions that implicate the Charter, to be defensible, a decision 
must accord with the fundamental values protected by the Charter”, and indeed that “in contexts where Charter 
rights are engaged, reasonableness requires proportionality”) and 113 (McLachlin CJ and Moldaver J, 
concurring) (dispensing with the Doré analysis altogether, on the basis that “[t]he Charter requirement that 
limits on rights be reasonable and demonstrably justified may be expressed in different ways in different 
contexts, but the basic constitutional requirement remains the same”); see also Leonid Sirota, “Splitting a 
Baby”, Double Aspect (blog), March 19, 2015, online: https://doubleaspect.blog/2015/03/19/splitting-a-baby/ 
(arguing that “[t]he pretense of deference under Doré is useless if there really is no difference between 
‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ as the majority suggests”) and Paul Daly, “Reasonableness, 
Proportionality and Religious Freedom: Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12”, 
Administrative Law Matters (blog), March 19, 2015, online: 
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/03/19/reasonableness-proportionality-and-religious-
freedom-loyola-high-school-v-quebec-attorney-general-2015-scc-12/> (wondering “why not simply call a 
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ignored to give effect to a “presumption of reasonableness” justified by the administrative 
decision-maker’s alleged expertise.66 
The affirmations of the belief in administrative decision-makers’ expertise over interpretive 
issues abound in Canadian case law. In NB Liquor, the Supreme Court held that the issue of 
statutory interpretation on which the case turned “would seem to lie logically at the heart of 
the specialized jurisdiction confided to the Board. In that case, not only would the Board not 
be required to be ‘correct’ in its interpretation, but one would think that the Board was 
entitled to err”, so long as its interpretation was not “patently unreasonable”.67 (The “patent 
unreasonableness” standard was subsequently abolished, or merged into that of 
reasonableness, in Dunsmuir.) A later concurring opinion by Justice Wilson, since quoted 
with approval in majority opinions, explained, that “[c]ourts have also come to accept that 
they may not be as well qualified as a given agency to provide interpretations of that agency’s 
constitutive statute that make sense given the broad policy context within which that agency 
must work”.68 Expertise was a significant part of the rationale for the re-affirmation of the 
appropriateness of deferential review of administrative interpretations of law in Dunsmuir.69 
Indeed, the dissenters in Edmonton East “acknowledge[d] that the notion of ‘expertise’ has 
become a catch-all trigger for deferential review in this Court’s jurisprudence, since an 
administrative decision maker is simply presumed to be an expert in matters regarding the 
application of its home statute”, and warned that “in strengthening the presumption by 
ignoring or explaining away any factors that might rebut it, the majority risks making this 
presumption irrebuttable”.70 The warning, one is inclined to say, is coming too late; the risk 
appears to already have materialized. 
Yet here again, and indeed even more than in the case of the review of factual or policy 
determinations by administrative decision-makers, it is necessary to ask whether the Supreme 
Court’s approach is the right one. Part of the reason for this is that judicial deference to 
administrative interpretations of law may be “unlawful” or inconsistent with the principle of 
the Rule of Law71 or, in some cases at least, a denial of constitutional justice72 or even 
                                               
66 See Edmonton East, supra note 31, at paras 75-80 (Brown and Côté JJ, dissenting) (analysing the applicable 
legislation to show that its intent was to make the administrative tribunal’s decisions (some) legal questions 
subject to correctness review); see also Sirota, “La-La-Land”, supra note 33 (arguing that “[f]or all its show of 
deference to the legislature, the [Edmonton East] majority only cares about its own views about how 
administrative law should operate”).  
67 NB Liquor, supra note 35, at 236-37. 
68 National Corn Growers Assn v Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 SCR 1324 at 1336; quoted with approval 
in McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 SCR 895 at para 31, and 
Edmonton East, supra note 31, at para 33. 
69 See Dunsmuir, supra note 20, at para 49. 
70 Edmonton East, supra note 31, at para 82 (Brown and Côté JJ, dissenting). 
71 See generally Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2014). 
72 Maxime St-Hilaire, “‘Dé-Doré’ son blason: le déni de justice constitutionnelle par la Cour suprême du 
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unconstitutional as a matter of positive law.73 But even setting these issues, as tremendously 
important as they are, aside, and remaining within the confines of this essay’s subject, one 
can question whether the deference to administrative decision-makers when it comes to 
statutory and constitutional issues is conducive to good governance.  
Once again, Judge Posner’s concerns about the lack of competence, resources and, especially, 
impartiality of administrative decision-makers are relevant. When it comes to competence, as 
the Edmonton East dissent pointed out, even administrators with undoubted expertise in 
complex factual or policy issues within their remit may not be experts in legal issues.74 
Administrative decision-makers are not necessarily appointed on the basis of legal expertise 
and may not be called upon to develop any in the exercise of their primarily fact- and policy-
centred role. Moreover, as also pointed out in the Edmonton East dissent, it may well be the 
case that, in some areas, even the real expertise of administrative decision-makers is matched 
or surpassed by that of the courts.75 Regarding resources, suffice it to note that, for various 
reasons, legal and constitutional issues may not even be raised, or may be poorly argued, 
before administrative decision-makers. As for politicization, not only are some administrative 
decision-makers to whose legal interpretation deference is due under the Supreme Court’s 
approach explicitly political actors,76 but even ostensibly non-political decision-makers are 
not entitled to constitutional protections for their independence,77 and can be subject to 
political pressure, up to and including wholesale removal by an incoming government that 
disagrees with their policy views.78 
In light of these concerns, the trend towards across-the-board deference to administrative 
decision-makers’ interpretations of law is, in my view, indefensible from a good governance 
perspective. The question of what should replace it. Paul Daly has suggested that “the only 
way to move the law forward within the existing framework without starting again from 
scratch is to apply reasonableness review across the board, with the important caveat (borne 
out … by the decisions on the merits in Kanthasamy and Saguenay) that the range of 
reasonable outcomes will be narrower in cases featuring an appeal clause.”79 That, of course, 
leaves open the question of whether the existing framework is worth preserving at all, and 
whether it would not be better to, indeed, start again from scratch. Justice Stratas argues for 
                                                                                                                                                  
<https://blogueaquidedroit.wordpress.com/2016/03/12/de-dore-son-blason-le-deni-de-justice-constitutionnelle-
de-la-cour-supreme-du-canada/>. 
73 See Paul Daly, “Is Deference Constitutional (in Canada)?”, Administrative Law Matters (blog), October 12, 
2017, online: <http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2017/10/12/is-deference-constitutional-in-
canada/>. 
74 Edmonton East, supra note 31, at para 83 (Brown and Côté JJ, dissenting). 
75 Ibid, at para 84. 
76 See note 54, above, and accompanying text. 
77 Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 
SCC 52, [2001] 2 SCR 781. 
78 See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Government of Saskatchewan, 2013 SKCA 61, 417 Sask R 50. 
79 Daly, “Way Forward”, supra note 33; Paul Daly, “Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative 
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“a more nuanced approach: reasonableness will apply only where legislative provisions 
expressly, impliedly or necessarily grant power to the administrative decision-maker to 
develop regulatory interpretations”.80 He cautions, however, that “[t]he non-monolithic nature 
of this area also suggests that the adoption of an across-the-board presumption that the 
standard of review for questions of law is correctness is equally inappropriate”.81 For my part, 
I am uneasy at the idea of any judicial deference to administrative decision-makers on 
questions of law, although, as an example used by Justice Stratas suggests, there may be 
some room for it where statutory language calls for construction, as opposed to interpretation 
alone.82  
However, this hunch—just like Professor Daly’s and Justice Stratas’ better-developed 
views—is not solely based on good governance considerations, and this is not the place to 
elaborate on it. Suffice it to say, for the present, that, as it has developed from NB Liquor to 
Dunsmuir to, most recently, Edmonton East, Canadian administrative law has overvalued, 
and arguably fetishized, administrative expertise, to the detriment of an overall pursuit of 
good governance, which, properly understood, should embrace not only technocratic 
expertise, but also a commitment to legality.  
— VI — 
Good governance is one of the important values that administrative law serves, in Canada as 
well as in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Across the common law world, courts 
provide remedies that may, or so one might hope, contribute to making public administration 
more efficient; its decision-making processes, more apt to take relevant information into 
account; and its ultimate decisions, more likely to be right. While they do not present these 
remedies as enforcing anything like a general right to good administration, common law 
courts may be just as effective as their counter-parts in those jurisdictions where such a right 
is recognized, in improving administrative decision-making. 
I have suggested, however, that good governance should not exclude, indeed that it should 
embrace, the narrow, and some might say old-fashioned, sense of legality: administrative 
decision-making should comply with the law laid down by legislatures and with entrenched 
constitutional rules, if any. On this score, Canadian administrative law offers a cautionary 
tale. A single-minded pursuit of one aspect of good governance, understood too narrowly as 
governance by experts, has meant that Canadian courts have abandoned their responsibility to 
enforce the law. 
                                               
80 Stratas, supra note 3, at 79. 
81 Ibid, at 81. 
82 Ibid, at 80 (describing the application of the “nuanced approach” to a case involving a securities 
commission’s statutory “power to suspend trading privileges when ‘reasonable’ or when ‘in the public interest’ 
(both undefined in the legislation)”; for more on the interpretation-construction distinction see Lawrence B 
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Needless to say, the judicial responsibility to enforce the law is associated not only, and not 
primarily, with good governance (though, to repeat, it would be a mistake not to associate it 
with good governance at all), but also with the Rule of Law. This reminds us that good 
governance is not the only value that administrative law furthers. The Rule of Law and the 
dignitarian interests that it serves on either a formal or a procedural understanding are 
arguably as or more important, although this is doubtless a subjective assessment. Other 
values, notably democracy (and its corollary legislative supremacy), are important too. The 
structure and the detail of administrative law doctrine are shaped by a balancing of—and 
sometimes the resolution of conflicts among—these values. I have endeavoured to present an 
overview of administrative law in Canada through the lens of only one of its guiding values. 
If I have succeeded, such a perspective may be of some use, but it is far from being a 
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